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When the Great Recession hit in 2007, 
the oldest baby boomers were nearly 
eligible for Social Security. Many of them 
recalled stories of the Great Depression 
and feared that their own nest eggs would 
vanish with too little time to make up the 
losses. Having lived most of their lives in 
an expanding economy, these Americans 
faced the real possibility of downward 
mobility just as they were entering their 
golden years. 
The downturn also heightened concerns 
about retirement planning—or lack of 
planning—by younger generations. Many 
younger Americans were already behind 
in saving for retirement, and suddenly 
millions of them were out of work or 
owned homes worth far less than they had 
been just a few years earlier.
This report explores how the Great 
Recession affected the wealth and 
retirement security of baby boomers 
relative to younger and older cohorts of 
Americans. The analysis compares their 
wealth to that of other cohorts at similar 
ages to understand how boomers are 
faring in relative terms. It also tracks the 
wealth of each cohort over the last two 
decades to assess the recession’s impact on 
each group’s financial security. Wealth is 
measured three ways: 
• Net worth is a comprehensive measure 
of wealth that includes all financial 
assets (such as savings and retirement 
accounts), nonfinancial assets (such as 
business property), and home equity, 
less debt.
• Financial net worth is a subset of net 
worth that includes just financial assets: 
savings accounts, 401(k)s, pensions, 
and individual retirement accounts.
• Home equity is a homeowner’s estimate 
of the difference between what the home 
could be sold for and what is owed on 
the mortgage.
Overview
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Additionally, the report explores the 
retirement security of each cohort by 
calculating replacement rates, or the 
extent to which retirees can use their 
accumulated wealth and savings to replace 
preretirement income. Surprisingly, this 
research reveals that younger cohorts are 
the ones who face a greater prospect of 
downward mobility in their golden years. 
Specifically, the study found:
• Early boomers (born between 
1946 and 1955) were approaching 
retirement in better financial shape 
than the cohorts that came before 
them. Benefitting from both the dot-
com boom and the housing bubble, 
early boomers had higher overall wealth, 
financial net worth, and home equity 
in their 50s and 60s than Depression 
babies (born between 1926 and 1935) 
or war babies (born between 1936 and 
1945) had at the same ages, putting 
these boomers in a strong financial 
position for retirement. 
• The picture of wealth accumulation 
and savings for Americans born after 
1955 was more mixed. Gen-Xers 
(born between 1966 and 1975) had 
higher net worth than late boomers 
(born between 1956 and 1965) when 
both were in their 30s and 40s, but 
neither group had as much wealth as 
early boomers had at the same age. 
Similarly, late boomers had more 
wealth than early boomers when both 
were in their 40s and 50s, but neither 
had as much as did war babies. 
 The situation for younger cohorts is 
more tenuous in terms of financial 
net worth. Neither Gen-Xers nor late 
boomers were on track to exceed the 
financial position of the cohorts that 
immediately preceded them. In their 30s 
and 40s, Gen-Xers lagged late boomers 
by about $6,000 by this metric, and in 
their 40s and 50s, late boomers lagged 
early boomers by more than $5,000.
• Both cohorts of baby boomers and 
Gen-Xers have significantly lower 
asset-to-debt ratios than do the older 
groups. Over the last two decades, 
Depression and war babies have been 
shedding debt, while boomers and 
Gen-Xers have been accumulating it. 
As of 2010, war babies’ asset levels 
were 27 times higher than their debt. 
In contrast, late boomers’ assets were 
about four times higher than their debt, 
and Gen-Xers’ assets were about double 
their debt.
• All groups experienced wealth losses 
in the Great Recession, but Gen-Xers 
took the hardest hit. Both early and 
late boomers were negatively affected by 
the recession at a critical point in their 
lives, losing 28 and 25 percent of their 
median net worth, respectively. From 
2007 to 2010, however, Gen-Xers lost 
nearly half (45 percent) of their wealth, 
an average of about $33,000, reducing 
their already low levels.
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• Replacement rate analysis shows that 
the youngest cohorts will not have 
enough assets for a secure retirement. 
Early boomers may be the last cohort on 
track to retire with enough savings and 
assets to maintain their financial security 
through their golden years. Even after 
the recession, they had acquired enough 
savings and wealth to replace nearly 
70 to 80 percent of their preretirement 
income. Replacement rates have steadily 
declined across the cohorts studied, 
putting the youngest on shaky financial 
footing. At the median, Gen-Xers 
will have enough resources to replace 
only about half of their preretirement 
income; late boomers will replace about 
60 percent.
This report delves into these findings, 
examining the evidence behind them, 
particularly the trends, by cohort, 
of wealth accumulation in periods 
immediately before, during, and just 
after the Great Recession. Through that 
lens, it considers the implications for the 
later-life economic security of millions of 
Americans currently in their prime-earning 
through early-retirement years.
WWW.ECONOMICMOBILITY.ORG
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The analysis begins by comparing cohorts’ 
net worth. This is a comprehensive metric 
that includes all financial assets (such 
as savings and retirement accounts), 
nonfinancial assets (such as business 
property), and home equity, minus debt.1 
Net worth is the total of wealth and as 
such provides a holistic picture of overall 
financial security.2
In the years leading up to the Great 
Recession, all cohorts saw wealth gains.
Between 1989 and 2007, all five birth 
cohorts saw gains in median net worth 
(see Figure 1). In fact, net worth losses 
were rare over this period, generally 
occurring during recessions or as older 
cohorts drew down assets in retirement. 
War babies and early boomers experienced 
losses in the 1990-1991 recession. 
Depression babies did so both from 1992 
to 1995, as they approached retirement 
age, and again from 2001 to 2004, as they 
drew down wealth in retirement.
Approaching retirement age, early 
boomers had higher median net worth 
than did older cohorts at the same ages.
Comparing the cohorts at three points in 
their lives—in their 30s/40s, 40s/50s, and 
50s/60s—shows how each group fared 
relative to previous generations at the 
same ages. Cohorts are analyzed based on 
the age ranges in which they fell in 1989, 
1998, and 2007. For example, Depression 
babies were in their 50s/60s in 1989; war 
babies were in their 40s/50s in 1989 and 
their 50s/60s in 1998; early boomers were 
Total Net Worth
COHORTS STUDIED
Depression babies were born between 
1926 and 1935 and are 78 to 87 years old .
War babies were born between 1936 and 
1945 and are 68 to 77 years old .
Early boomers were born between 1946 
and 1955 and are 58 to 67 years old .
Late boomers were born between 1956 
and 1965 and are 48 to 57 years old .
Gen-Xers were born between 1966 and 
1975 and are 38 to 47 years old .
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in their 30s/40s in 1989, their 40s/50s 
in 1998, and their 50s/60s in 2007; late 
boomers were in their 30s/40s in 1998 
and their 40s/50s in 2007; and Gen-Xers 
were in their 30s/40s in 2007.
This cohort comparison reveals that 
prior to the recession, early boomers 
were approaching retirement with 
higher median wealth than the cohorts 
before them. By the time they were in 
their 50s/60s, early boomers had just 
over $241,000 in median wealth. By 
comparison, war babies had $170,604 and 
Depression babies had $162,222 at the 
same ages (see Figure 2).
Despite their advantage at retirement age, 
early boomers were not always on track 
to surpass war babies. The latter group 
WEALTH TRENDED STEADILY UPWARD IN THE DECADES BEFORE THE GREAT RECESSION
FIGURE 1.  WEALTH TRENDS BY COHORT, 1989-2007 
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had higher median wealth in their 40s/50s 
than did the early boomers ($156,521 
versus $131,761). Benefitting from both 
the dot-com boom and the housing 
bubble, early boomers experienced an 
83 percent growth in total assets between 
their 40s/50s and 50s/60s, while war 
babies saw only 9 percent growth between 
the same ages a decade earlier.
The net worth levels of the cohorts 
that followed early boomers, however, 
suggests a less-certain future. 
In their 30s/40s, the youngest cohort, 
Gen-Xers, had more wealth than those 
of the next-oldest, the late boomers, at 
the same age. It is important to note that 
Gen-Xers’ net worth in their 30s/40s 
was measured shortly after the peak of 
the housing boom. But neither cohort 
matched the wealth of early boomers 
when they were in their 30s/40s.
BEFORE THE RECESSION, EARLY BOOMERS WERE WELL-POSITIONED FOR 
RETIREMENT, COMPARED WITH OLDER AMERICANS AT THE SAME AGE
FIGURE 2.  WEALTH LEVELS BY COHORT AT THREE AGE BRACKETS
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By their 40s/50s, late boomers benefited 
from economic growth between 1998 and 
2007, which put them on more secure 
footing relative to the next-oldest group, 
early boomers, at the same age. At this 
stage of their lives, however, late boomers 
still did not have as much wealth as war 
babies had. 
The Great Recession caused substantive 
losses in median net worth, with Gen-Xers 
taking the hardest hit.
Excluding Depression babies, who 
were well into retirement age when the 
Great Recession hit, each of the cohorts 
lost considerable net worth during the 
downturn, both in dollar and percentage 
terms. For these four cohorts, losses 
were so severe that even in 2010, as the 
national economic recovery took hold, 
median wealth remained lower than it 
had been in 2004. 
As detailed in Table 1, the recession 
caught early and late boomers at a critical 
point in their lives—approaching or 
having just entered retirement—and both 
were negatively affected, losing 28 and 
25 percent of their wealth, respectively. 
But it’s the youngest cohort, Gen-Xers, 
who experienced the largest declines in 
median net worth. From 2007 to 2010, 
this group lost nearly half (45 percent) 
of their wealth—a loss at the median of 
about $33,000, decreasing already low 
accumulations.
As noted above, net worth is total assets 
minus total debt. To better understand 
how the cohorts compare in terms of 
net worth, it is useful to consider each 
component—median assets and debt—
separately. 
Each cohort’s median assets grew steadily 
between 1989 and 2007, with the three 
youngest showing consistent and parallel 
growth over this period (see Figure 3). 
With the exception of Depression babies, 
each cohort then experienced recession-
driven asset declines between 2007 and 
2010. Still, Figure 3 makes clear that all 
THE GREAT RECESSION DEPLETED THE WEALTH OF VIRTUALLY ALL COHORTS 
TABLE 1. WEALTH LOSSES DURING THE GREAT RECESSION
2004 2007 2010
Median Loss 
2007-2010
Percent Change 
2007-2010
Depression Babies $197,508 $207,965 $207,500 $465 0%
War Babies $265,201 $265,797 $212,300 $53,497 -20%
Early Boomers $192,215 $241,333 $173,480 $67,853 -28%
Late Boomers $119,207 $147,671 $110,870 $36,801 -25%
Gen-Xers $43,299 $75,077 $41,600 $33,477 -45%
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
Note: Net worth is adjusted to 2010 dollars.
Median Net Worth
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cohorts experienced net growth since 
1989, suggesting a healthy rate of asset 
accumulation. 
For baby boomers and Gen-Xers, however, 
the period between 1989 and 2007 was 
also marked by similarly high rates of debt 
accumulation (see Figure 4). Leading up 
to and after the recession, each of the three 
youngest cohorts increased their debt 
significantly, with Gen-Xers taking on the 
most. In 2010, Gen-Xers had more than 
$80,000 in debt, exceeding by $20,000 
the levels of the next-most-indebted 
cohort, the late boomers.
Over the same period, the two oldest 
cohorts were systematically shedding debt. 
By 2007, Depression babies had zero debt 
at the median, while war babies had just 
over $15,000.
MEDIAN ASSETS OF EVERY COHORT GREW BEFORE THE RECESSION, THEN FELL 
DURING THE RECESSION 
FIGURE 3. ASSET LEVELS BY COHORT, 1989-2010
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The stark differences in debt accumulation 
across cohorts is most clearly demonstrated 
by asset-to-debt ratios.3 The two boomer 
cohorts and Gen-Xers do have more assets 
than debt, but their ratios are significantly 
lower than those of the older cohorts (see 
Figure 5). In 2010, war babies’ assets were 
nearly 27 times their debt while Gen-Xers’ 
assets were less than twice their debt. 
Depression babies’ ratios are not shown 
on the chart below because by 1995, their 
assets exceeded their debt by more than 
50 to 1. By 2007, more than half of all 
Depression babies were debt-free.
Asset-to-debt ratios certainly reflect lifecycle 
effects. Without a doubt, Depression babies 
and war babies would be unlikely to seek 
debt in retirement and would be relying on 
their assets for living expenses.
BABY BOOMERS AND GEN-XERS ACCUMULATED LARGE AMOUNTS OF DEBT BEFORE THE 
GREAT RECESSION, WITH DECLINES SINCE
FIGURE 4. DEBT TRENDS BY COHORT, 1989-2010 
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The employed younger cohorts would 
be most likely to increase debt levels as 
they maintain mortgages, pay educational 
expenses, and seek car loans while also 
building assets for the future. 
Baby boomers, however, are approaching 
retirement with higher levels of debt than 
their predecessors, suggesting historical 
increases in the use of debt later in life.4
YOUNGER AMERICANS HAVE FAR FEWER ASSETS, RELATIVE TO DEBT, THAN DO OLDER 
AMERICANS
FIGURE 5. ASSET-TO-DEBT RATIOS BY COHORT, 1989-2010
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The previous discussion of total net worth 
compares the cohorts in terms of overall 
wealth, which includes home equity. 
Understanding how they compared at 
various ages in regard to savings alone, 
however, provides critical information 
about retirement planning and future 
financial security. This section compares 
the five cohorts by the more limited metric 
of financial net worth, which includes 
savings, 401(k)s, pensions, and individual 
retirement accounts.
Before the Great Recession, the three 
youngest cohorts’ financial net worth was 
growing.
Between 1989 and 2007, early boomers 
saw their retirement savings grow 251 
percent to more than $75,000 (see Figure 
6). Late boomers saw an even larger 
increase, 675 percent, over the same 
period, to just over $40,000. Gen-Xers 
experienced the largest percentage savings 
and retirement growth at more than 1,000 
percent, from less than $2,000 in 1989 to 
more than $19,000 in 2007. 
The oldest cohorts, Depression and war 
babies, sustained fairly substantial hits 
to their financial net worth in the 2000-
2001 recession. Despite this, war babies 
still ended this period with more than 100 
percent growth, and the overall decline 
experienced by Depression babies was 
likely driven in part by them tapping their 
accounts in retirement and by investment 
or other economy-driven losses.
Despite strong gains in financial net 
worth, the youngest cohorts are less 
prepared for retirement than previous 
cohorts were at the same ages. 
As with total net worth, each of the three 
oldest cohorts approached retirement on 
better financial footing than the one that 
came immediately before. In their 50s/60s, 
early boomers had greater financial wealth 
than war babies at the same age, and war 
babies in turn had greater financial wealth 
than Depression babies (see Figure 7).
Even before the recession, however, late 
boomers and Gen-Xers were not on track 
to continue this trend. In their 30s/40s, 
Gen-Xers had less financial wealth than 
did either of the boomer cohorts at the 
same age. Late boomers had greater 
savings than did early boomers in their 
Financial Net Worth
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30s/40s, but by the time they reached their 
40s/50s, they had fallen behind their older 
peers by an average of $5,000. 
Aside from Depression babies, all cohorts 
lost considerable financial net worth in 
the Great Recession.
Coming out of the recession, all the 
cohorts experienced declines in financial 
net worth from their 2007 averages (see 
Table 2). By 2010, it had fallen by 30 
percent for war babies, 26 percent for early 
boomers, 23 percent for late boomers, and 
25 percent for Gen-Xers. Early boomers 
and war babies experienced the largest 
BABY BOOMERS AND GEN-XERS EXPERIENCED LARGE GAINS IN FINANCIAL NET WORTH 
BEFORE THE RECESSION
FIGURE 6. FINANCIAL NET WORTH TRENDS BY COHORT, 1989-2007
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losses in absolute dollars—about  
$20,000 each—because they had the 
highest savings to lose. War babies, 
however, were 65 and older by 2010, 
so some of their decline could be 
attributable to drawing down financial 
assets in retirement.5 
LATE BOOMERS AND GEN-XERS ARE LESS-PREPARED FOR RETIREMENT THAN OLDER 
AMERICANS
FIGURE 7. FINANCIAL NET WORTH BY COHORT AT THREE AGE BRACKETS
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ALL GROUPS, EXCEPT THE VERY OLDEST, EXPERIENCED SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL LOSSES 
DURING THE GREAT RECESSION  
TABLE 2. FINANCIAL NET WORTH LOSSES BY COHORT, 2007-2010
2007 2010
Median Loss 
2007-2010
Percent Change 
2007-2010
Depression Babies $43,018 $40,700 $2,318 -5%
War Babies $65,428 $45,500 $19,928 -30%
Early Boomers $75,852 $55,850 $20,002 -26%
Late Boomers $41,844 $32,135 $9,709 -23%
Gen-Xers $19,382 $14,500 $4,882 -25%
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
Note: Net worth is adjusted to 2010 dollars.
Median Financial Net Worth
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At the end of the recession, a majority of 
each of the five cohorts were homeowners 
(see Table 3). The two youngest cohorts—
late boomers and Gen-Xers—had lower 
rates of homeownership than the older 
three, but the housing bubble and 
subsequent crash still had powerful 
implications for the retirement security 
and overall wealth of every group.
Leading up to the recession, younger 
cohorts saw the largest gains in home 
equity.
In the two decades before the recession, 
each cohort saw dramatic gains in home 
equity (see Figure 8). The three youngest 
cohorts—early boomers, late boomers, 
and Gen-Xers—however, experienced the 
largest increases in this period, with  
Gen-Xers realizing the biggest gains: 
from about $20,000 in 1989 to more 
than $67,000 in 2007, an increase of 231 
percent. Late boomers saw comparable 
growth in percentage terms (227 percent), 
increasing their home equity from $32,000 
in 1989 to nearly $105,000 in 2007.
The housing bubble pushed younger 
cohorts’ home equity above levels held 
by previous cohorts at the same ages. 
Before the housing boom, early boomers 
were in their 40s/50s, and their home 
equity was about 30 percent lower than 
war babies’ had been at the same ages 
(see Figure 9). Then, as the early boomers 
were reaching to their 50/60s, the housing 
bubble occurred, boosting their equity 96 
percent and putting them well ahead of 
Home Equity
LATE BOOMERS AND GEN-XERS HAD LOWER HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES THAN OLDER 
AMERICANS  
TABLE 3. POST-RECESSION RATES OF HOMEOWNERSHIP BY COHORT
Depression  
Babies War Babies
Early  
Boomers Late Boomers Gen-Xers
2010 82.0% 82.8% 77.8% 75.2% 63.0%
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
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where both older cohorts had been as they 
approached retirement. Similarly, as late 
boomers entered their 40s/50s, a bubble-
driven home equity increase of 118 
percent pushed their levels above what 
early boomers had a decade earlier. 
All cohorts lost home equity during the 
housing bust but still came out ahead.
All the cohorts lost some home equity 
during the recession, with only Depression 
babies emerging relatively unscathed (see 
Table 4). Gen-Xers lost 27 percent of their 
equity between 2007 and 2010, the largest 
percentage loss of the groups studied.6 
Still, it’s important to note that all cohorts 
gained significantly more equity in the 
run-up to the recession than they lost in its 
M
E
D
IA
N
 H
O
M
E
 E
Q
U
IT
Y
 (2
01
0 
D
O
LL
A
R
S
)
Gen-Xers
War 
Babies
Early 
Boomers
Late 
Boomers
Depression 
Babies
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
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BEFORE THE HOUSING CRASH, YOUNGER COHORTS HAD MORE HOME EQUITY THAN 
OLDER AMERICANS DID AT THE SAME AGES
FIGURE 9. HOME EQUITY BY COHORT FOR THREE AGE BRACKETS
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aftermath. As shown in the final column of 
Table 4, even in the wake of the housing 
collapse, homeowners in every cohort 
ended the recession with more median 
equity than they had before the boom. 
Even after their significant losses, Gen-X 
homeowners had an increase in median 
home equity between 1998 and 2010 of 
116 percent. 
But the gains were not enjoyed as widely 
among this youngest cohort as they were 
for older groups. Less than two-thirds (63 
percent) of Gen-Xers were homeowners in 
2010 (see Table 3). So, more than one-
third of them did not benefit from the 
equity growth that occurred in the decade 
before the housing bubble because they 
did not own a home.
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THOUGH ALL GROUPS LOST HOME EQUITY DURING THE GREAT RECESSION, THEY STILL HAD 
NET EQUITY GAINS COMPARED WITH PRE-HOUSING BOOM LEVELS 
TABLE 4. HOME EQUITY LEVELS BY COHORT, 1998-2010
1998 2007 2010
Median Loss 
During  
Recession
Percent 
Change During 
Recession
Percent 
Change 
1998-2010
Depression Babies $109,379 $145,104 $141,000 $4,104 -3% 29%
War Babies $98,708 $157,152 $127,000 $30,152 -19% 29%
Early Boomers $73,364 $143,532 $112,000 $31,532 -22% 53%
Late Boomers $48,020 $104,768 $90,000 $14,768 -14% 87%
Gen-Xers $22,676 $67,052 $49,000 $18,052 -27% 116%
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
Note: Home equity is adjusted to 2010 dollars.
Median Home Equity
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Overall Recessionary Impact
The data discussed above clearly show that 
working-age and retired Americans alike 
lost wealth during the Great Recession. But 
not every household suffered wealth losses 
in the economic downturn, and a sizable 
number in each cohort actually gained 
wealth between 2007 and 2009.
Even after the recession, large majorities 
in every cohort had positive wealth 
holdings.
Majorities in every cohort retained at least 
some assets after the recession, and only 
very small percentages in each reported 
having no net worth. As Figure 10 
shows, from 1989 to 2007, the percent 
reporting zero net worth declined steadily 
in every cohort, reflecting the aging of 
each group and the wealth building that 
generally happens over a lifetime. From 
2007 through the post-recessionary 
period in 2010, some cohorts had a 
small uptick in the percentages with 
no wealth. The youngest cohorts—late 
boomers and Gen-Xers—had the highest 
such proportions after the recession, but 
even those rates were low (about 6 and 7 
percent, respectively).
Not all households lost net worth during 
the recession. 
Not all households experienced negative 
effects from the recession, and some 
actually gained wealth during this period. 
Using data from the Panel Study on 
Income Dynamics, a longitudinal study 
that follows the same households over 
time, demonstrates that there was actually 
a great deal of variation within and 
across cohorts in the degree to which the 
recession affected wealth. 
In fact, a sizable minority of households, 
ranging from 39 to 44 percent of all 
households (see Table 5), had improved 
median net worth, financial net worth, 
and retirement accounts between 2007 
and 2009. In the case of home equity, 
more than one-third of households across 
the cohorts experienced gains during the 
same two-year period. This is particularly 
notable because among all Americans, 
wealth declined between 2007 and 2009.
Looking across the cohorts, there was 
some variation in whose wealth rose and 
whose fell. Among the oldest, Depression 
babies, 67 percent lost net worth, which 
is not entirely surprising given that a 
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DESPITE RECESSION-ERA LOSSES, MOST AMERICANS RETAINED AT LEAST SOME WEALTH
FIGURE 10. PERCENTAGE REPORTING ZERO WEALTH BY COHORT, 1989-2010
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majority of people in this group were 
retired and drawing down their assets. 
The next-largest loss was among the late 
boomers; 62 percent of those households 
had a decline in median net worth 
between 2007 and 2009. The housing 
collapse also hit this group particularly 
hard, with 68 percent reporting home 
equity losses.
Conversely, about half of the two youngest 
cohorts, late boomers and Gen-Xers, 
experienced gains to their retirement 
accounts between 2007 and 2009, far 
outperforming the older cohorts on this 
metric.
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SIZABLE MINORITIES EXPERIENCED WEALTH GAINS DURING THE RECESSION 
TABLE 5. CHANGES IN WEALTH BY COHORT, 2007-2009
Net Worth Financial Net Worth Housing Equity Retirement Accounts
Gains Losses Gains Losses Gains Losses Gains Losses
All
Percent 39.0% -61.0% 43.3% -56.7% 33.8% -66.2% 44.1% -55.9%
Median Gain/Loss $42,437 -$77,524 $19,929 -$27,465 $16,204 -$39,838 $16,003 -$32,492
Depression Babies
Percent 32.6% -67.4% 38.1% -61.9% 31.4% -68.6% 41.6% -58.4%
Median Gain/Loss $68,519 -$95,205 $15,244 -$45,233 $15,971 -$33,899 $9,288 -$13,246
War Babies
Percent 38.8% -61.2% 38.4% -61.7% 35.9% -64.1% 43.0% -57.0%
Median Gain/Loss $47,872 -$125,400 $32,680 -$43,600 $17,330 -$41,230 $10,291 -$91,967
Early Boomers
Percent 41.4% -58.6% 46.9% -53.1% 33.7% -66.3% 35.8% -64.2%
Median Gain/Loss $58,411 -$82,405 $27,715 -$42,055 $17,850 -$40,615 $18,220 -$36,298
Late Boomers
Percent 38.0% -62.0% 42.2% -57.8% 32.4% -67.6% 50.1% -49.9%
Median Gain/Loss $36,324 -$65,847 $18,932 -$18,424 $15,372 -$44,951 $21,618 -$32,670
Gen-Xers
Percent 41.3% -58.7% 47.5% -52.6% 35.7% -64.3% 48.9% -51.1% 
Median Gain/Loss $31,380 -$48,076 $9,822 -$8,890 $15,214 -$42,848 $10,964 -$13,851
 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 2007-2009.
Note: All dollar values are adjusted to 2009 dollars. 
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Considering Recessionary Losses, 
Are Americans Prepared for 
Retirement?
There is no doubt that the recession 
eroded the wealth of many Americans. 
And notably, even before it occurred, 
younger cohorts appeared less prepared 
for retirement than their older peers had 
been at the same age, making their losses 
even more troubling. Still, measuring 
absolute wealth declines does not tell the 
full story about any one cohort’s retirement 
security. By estimating each cohort’s 
replacement rates—the amount of their 
working-age income they will be able to 
replace through savings when retired— 
it is possible to more fully evaluate the 
implications of the Great Recession.
Replacement rates have become the 
standard metric for comparing the 
preparedness of households on the verge 
of retirement. Financial planners suggest 
that individuals should ideally be able to 
replace 70 to 100 percent of their annual 
income through savings and wealth during 
retirement. 
This analysis calculates replacement rates 
using a comprehensive measure of wealth 
that includes net worth plus the value 
of annuitized assets, such as pensions 
and Social Security. The analysis also 
assumes retirement at age 65 and takes 
into account how factors such as average 
life expectancy, savings and wealth levels, 
earnings while working, and access to 
pensions or employer retirement plans 
differ across demographic groups and 
household types. (For more information 
about how replacement rates were 
calculated, see the Data and Methods 
section on page 27.) 
Rates shown for Depression and war 
babies are based on survey data about 
their earnings history and wealth levels as 
they entered retirement, while those for 
younger cohorts are projections based on 
their earnings history, projected earnings, 
and wealth accumulation to 2009, the 
most recent year of data available.
The youngest cohorts are unprepared for 
retirement.
While the wealth data provided earlier 
in this report look at each cohort in its 
entirety, fully understanding retirement 
preparedness demands a deeper dive as 
post-employment security is not uniform, 
even within a particular cohort. Figure 11 
shows median replacement rates for three 
types of households in each cohort: single 
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LATE BOOMERS AND GEN-XERS DO NOT HAVE ADEQUATE RESOURCES FOR 
RETIREMENT AND ARE FACING POSSIBLE DOWNWARD MOBILITY 
FIGURE 11. REPLACEMENT RATES BY COHORT AND HOUSEHOLD TYPE
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Note: The replacement rate calculations project how much wealth individuals and families may have 
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100 percent means that an individual or family would have exactly the same money in retirement that 
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men, single women, and couples. Showing 
the rates separately by household type 
provides a clearer picture of the range of 
retirement preparedness within and across 
each cohort and highlights the effect of the 
above-noted demographic factors. 
 
War babies have the highest replacement 
rates in all three household types. While 
each of the early-boomer household 
types have lower replacement rates than 
their war baby peers, they still appear to 
have adequate income replacement for a 
financially secure retirement.
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But replacement rates have declined 
steadily with each subsequent cohort, 
reaching the lowest values for Gen-Xers. 
Median rates for late boomers and Gen-
Xers are barely above 60 and 50 percent, 
respectively, below what is generally 
regarded as adequate. Because these are 
medians, the data suggest that at least half 
of late-boomer and Gen-Xer households 
fall below these already low levels and may 
be facing an insecure retirement.
Median replacement rates have shrunk 
among successive cohorts of Americans. 
At the same time, inequality in retirement 
preparation within cohorts has grown.
This analysis compares the ratios of the 
lowest replacement rate in each cohort 
to the median rate in that same cohort 
and of the highest rate to the median.7 
This approach captures how much 
distance there is between the most- and 
least-prepared households and median 
households within each cohort. Between 
RETIREMENT READINESS HAS BECOME MORE UNEQUAL OVER TIME 
FIGURE 12. REPLACEMENT RATE RATIOS BETWEEN THE MEDIAN AND THE LEAST-
PREPARED, AND BETWEEN THE MOST-PREPARED AND THE MEDIAN, BY COHORT
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RETIREMENT PREPAREDNESS OVERALL HAS DECLINED ACROSS GENERATIONS 
TABLE 6.  MEDIAN REPLACEMENT RATES BY COHORT
Depression  
Babies War Babies
Early  
Boomers
Late  
Boomers Gen-Xers
Median Replacement Rates 86% 99% 82% 59% 50%
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
Note: The replacement rates are calculated assuming retirement at age 65.     
the lowest rate and the median, Figure 12 
shows that the ratio varies across cohorts, 
with the typical retiree—one at the median 
rate—having replacement rates three to 
six times greater than those least prepared 
to retire, that is, those with the lowest 
rate. There was less variation among baby 
boomers and Depression babies, and more 
within the war baby and Gen-X cohorts. 
So on the whole, there is no obvious trend 
across birth cohorts when comparing the 
least prepared with the middle. 
By comparison, however, the ratio of 
the highest to the median replacement 
rates has steadily increased across all five 
cohorts, from 6.6 among Depression 
babies to nearly twice that—11.8—among 
Gen-Xers. In other words, those Gen-
Xers most prepared for retirement have a 
replacement rate nearly 12 times higher 
than their peers at the middle, reflecting 
that retirement preparedness within 
cohorts has become increasingly varied 
over time. 
Importantly, however, this growing 
inequality in retirement readiness is due to 
median replacement rates declining, not 
to the highest rates rising. Table 6 shows 
the median replacement rates for each 
cohort. The downward trend in median 
rates across the cohorts indicates that the 
middle household has become increasingly 
less prepared for retirement with each 
subsequent cohort. Among war babies, the 
typical retiree was able to replace nearly 
100 percent of his or her preretirement 
income, but Gen-Xers at the median will 
replace only 50 percent. 
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Conclusion
The evidence strongly suggests that early 
boomers may be the last generation on 
track to exceed the wealth of the cohorts 
that came before them and to enjoy a 
secure retirement. Early boomers’ wealth, 
financial net worth, and home equity in 
their 50s/60s put them ahead of where 
Depression and war babies were at the 
same ages, and their replacement rates 
suggest that, even after the recession, they 
are well-prepared for retirement. The 
same cannot be said, however, for late 
boomers. In terms of overall wealth and 
home equity, they were ahead of where 
early boomers had been in their 40s/50s. 
But they fell behind their older cohort in 
financial net worth, and their replacement 
rates also suggest an insecure future. 
Across the five cohorts studied, however, 
Gen-Xers are the least financially secure 
and the most likely to experience 
downward mobility in retirement. In their 
30s/40s, the Gen-X cohort was behind 
where late boomers had been at the same 
age with respect to financial net worth, 
and they lost nearly half of their overall 
wealth in the recession. Gen-Xers’ high 
debt relative to assets stands in contrast 
to older groups that had lower debt at the 
same age. While Gen-Xers did experience 
the largest gains in home equity among 
the five cohorts, they also have the lowest 
rates of homeownership, minimizing the 
benefit of those equity gains for the cohort 
as a whole. Gen-Xers also have the lowest 
predicted replacement rates, with half or 
more unlikely to replace more than 50 
percent of their preretirement earnings 
through savings and wealth. 
Notably, the data above clearly point to a 
lack of savings and wealth accumulation 
among Gen-Xers even before the 
economic downturn. As policymakers 
focus attention on Americans’ retirement 
security, particular consideration should 
be paid to helping the youngest cohorts 
change course and prepare for financial 
security over the long term.
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Data and Methods
This report relies upon two data sets, 
the Survey of Consumer Finances and 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, in 
addition to a host of analytic approaches 
to best understand wealth trends and 
projected retirement replacement rates for 
different birth cohorts. 
The five cohorts featured in this study are 
defined according to their years of birth. 
Depression babies were born between 
1926 and 1935 and are currently 78 to 87 
years old. War babies were born between 
1936 and 1945 and are currently 68 to 
77 years old. Early boomers were born 
between 1946 and 1955 and are currently 
58 to 67 years old. Late boomers were 
born between 1956 and 1965 and are 
currently 48 to 57 years old. The youngest 
in this study, Gen-Xers, were born between 
1966 and 1975 and are currently 38 to 47 
years old.
Trends in wealth by cohort over time
To explore wealth trends for the cohorts 
over time, this study uses the Survey of 
Consumer Finances, collected by the 
Federal Reserve Board every three years 
from a large, representative sample of 
Americans. Collected in its current form 
since 1983, the survey is considered 
the highest-quality data available for 
understanding household wealth. The 
analyses in this report use cross-sectional 
data from 1989 through 2010 to construct 
historical trends of the five cohorts’ wealth. 
For each survey year of data, individuals 
are identified as being in a particular 
cohort according to their birth years. This 
method allows the cross-sectional data of 
the Survey of Consumer Finances to be 
compared across cohorts over two decades 
and at different lifecycle points.
The data in the survey are collected 
according to a primary economic unit, 
which represents the economic activity of 
a family household. Inflation-adjustments 
to September 2010 dollars were performed 
by the survey to its public data sets to 
allow comparability across time to the 
most recent survey year. All data in this 
study’s analyses are weighted and divided 
by five. Dividing the weight by five is 
required because of the survey’s unique 
method of imputing missing data by 
providing five implicates (in a sense, 
estimates) for each household.
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Various forms of wealth are measured in 
this study using the Survey of Consumer 
Finances, including total net worth, 
financial net worth, and home equity. Also 
explored is the balance of assets relative to 
debt that each of the cohorts holds:
Total net worth in the survey includes 
all financial assets, such as savings and 
retirement accounts; nonfinancial assets, 
such as business property; and home 
equity, less any debt the household 
reports. All individuals in all cohorts are 
included in total net worth analyses in 
this study. 
Financial net worth is a subset of total net 
worth that includes only financial assets, 
such as savings, 401(k)s, pensions, and 
individual retirement accounts. Only 
individuals who reported having financial 
net worth are included in analyses with 
this measure.
Home equity is the reported value of a 
home less the amount owed on it. Only 
homeowners’ reported values are included 
in analyses of this measure.
Assets are positive wealth holdings, while 
debt include amounts owed on homes, 
vehicles, or loans, for example. An 
asset-to-debt ratio is constructed for all 
households in all cohorts to understand 
the magnitude with which assets outweigh 
debt. While researchers typically construct 
a debt-to-asset ratio, this analysis flips the 
ratio to focus on wealth and retirement 
preparedness across cohorts. 
Replacement rate methodology 
The replacement rate calculations, as well 
as one table that compares recessionary 
gains and losses within families in 
each cohort, rely on the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics, or PSID. The PSID is a 
longitudinal data set that has followed the 
same families from 1968 to present. The 
PSID has been conducted continually since 
1968, switching from annual to biennial 
data collection as of 1997. The analyses 
in this report rely upon PSID data from 
1989 through 2009.
Replacement rate calculations project 
the anticipated wealth that individuals 
and families may have upon retirement 
given current income levels and wealth 
accumulation. It provides a benchmark 
for whether individuals and families will 
have the money they need at retirement 
to sustain their working-age standard of 
living. A replacement rate of 100 percent 
means that the individual or family would 
have exactly the same money in retirement 
that they had in their preretirement years, 
while a value below 100 percent signals 
they would have less, and a value above 
100 percent would mean they are more 
than adequately prepared. There is some 
debate about what an ideal replacement 
rate would be, but financial planners 
suggest that individuals should ideally be 
able to replace 70 to 100 percent of their 
annual income.
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In this report, replacement rate 
calculations involved multiple steps 
both to create the data and to perform 
the analyses. Replacement rates were 
calculated by:
• Obtaining a comprehensive wealth 
estimate (called “augmented wealth”) 
by summing measured wealth (or net 
worth) as reported in the PSID, defined 
benefit pensions, and Social Security 
benefits of the household head at age 65.
• Projecting augmented wealth forward 
annually for the combined life 
expectancy of the household head and 
spouse given their sex and race.
• Discounting future annuitized values 
to present value terms given when 
household heads turn age 65 using 
appropriate discount rates. 
• Calculating the ratio to estimate the 
discounted present value to the average 
income of the household in the years 
between the household heads’ ages 
60 and 64. 
The methodology for each of these 
steps is explained in greater detail in the 
following sections.
Creation of the comprehensive wealth 
estimate, or augmented wealth
The net worth estimates reported in 
the PSID excluded two key forms of 
annuitized household wealth—Social 
Security benefits, or SSB, and defined 
benefit, or DB, pension wealth—because 
they are typically not reported in wealth 
surveys, being future income flows rather 
than stocks of wealth holdings. But both 
forms of annuitized wealth are critically 
important to obtaining an accurate 
estimate of retirement preparedness (as 
measured by replacement rates), because 
of both their predictability and their size 
relative to other sources of wealth for the 
majority of retired households. Various 
studies have found that Social Security 
benefits and defined benefit pensions 
account for half or more of household net 
worth.8 
Therefore, using the PSID, it was necessary 
to create a comprehensive measure of 
retirement wealth at age 65, which we call 
“augmented wealth” which combines total 
(nonannuitized) net worth with the two 
main sources of annuitized wealth—SSB 
and DB pension wealth.9 We estimated 
augmented wealth for the five birth 
cohorts as of household heads’ being 
age 65 (or as near to age 65 as possible 
when all sources were reported in order 
to compare cohorts’ replacement rates at a 
common age).
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Projecting wealth forward
The methods for estimating augmented 
wealth were affected both by the range of 
years covered and by features of the PSID 
surveys themselves. For example, methods 
differed for the oldest two and youngest 
three cohorts. The two oldest birth cohorts 
(Depression babies and war babies) had 
already reached age 64 by 2009. Hence, 
by 2009 most of those households were 
already receiving SSB and DB pension 
benefits, and the amounts were known 
and would change over time in reasonably 
predictable ways. Estimates of marketable 
(nonannuitized) net worth, SSB, and DB 
for most of these two older birth cohorts at 
or near age 65 were obtained directly from 
the survey responses. 
Because of the nature of the survey 
questions, however, data were not always 
available for these older two cohorts at age 
65, requiring the addition of household 
estimates from later survey years. This was 
true in part because SSB was sometimes 
collected on the PSID in a given survey year 
as household totals, rather than separate 
benefit amounts for each spouse. In such 
cases, benefit amounts were obtained in 
later years when spouses’ benefits were 
identified separately. Furthermore, pensions 
were not included in the PSID surveys 
in 1989 and 1994, and questions about 
defined benefit and defined contribution 
plans were first asked in 1999. So, most of 
Depression babies’ wealth was not available  
until 1999, when they were ages 64 to 73. 
Their wealth totals then had to be adjusted 
back to levels at age 65.
For the three youngest birth cohorts 
(early boomers, late boomers, and Gen-
Xers), most of whom were still working in 
2009, household net worth was projected 
forward from age 65 to their expected life 
span based on historical growth rates for 
housing, stock, and per capita net worth 
and life expectancy tables from the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention. The 
rates used included 8.1 percent per year 
for stocks (based on the average growth 
in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index from 
1971 to 2011), 3.4 percent for housing 
(based on the S&P/Case-Shiller index of 
housing prices from 1988-2011), and 6.1 
percent for all other net worth (based on 
Federal Reserve Flow of Funds estimates 
for mean per capita annual growth in net 
worth from 1968 to 2009). 
PSID surveys (since 1999) asked workers 
about pensions they either were receiving 
or expected to receive, when they expected 
to receive them, how much they would 
receive, and whether they were indexed 
for inflation. This information allowed 
for the projection of expected lifetime DB 
pension benefits for head and spouse. To 
estimate future SSB for younger cohorts 
in the PSID, individual earnings for these 
cohorts were projected to age 65 with a 
human capital approach similar to that 
described in Wolff (2011, 2007, 2005) 
and Kennickell and Sunden (1997). An 
estimated log-linear model of earnings was 
developed with Current Population Survey 
data, with the natural log of earnings as 
the dependent variable and a series of 
regressors that included hours worked, 
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years of experience, years of education, 
and several indicator variables, including 
self-employed or not, occupation code, 
marital status, and race: 
ln (earnings) = α + β1 ln (hours), β2 
ln (experience), β3 ln (education), β4 
(self-employed), β5 (occupation), β6 
(marital status), β7 (race) 
The coefficients from the CPS regressions 
were applied to observations in the PSID 
to estimate earnings for PSID households 
in 2009 and subsequent years, controlling 
for those variables, and then projected 
individual earnings forward at an overall 
nominal rate of 4 percent per year to 
generate annual percentage increases 
in earnings for workers to age 65. This 
implicitly assumes that relationships among 
the variables remained stable over time. 
Once earnings were projected to age 65, 
the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings 
were calculated, then converted to 
the Primary Insurance Amount using 
historical and projected bend points, and 
then actuarial adjustments were made to 
benefits at age 65 based on when benefits 
were first taken. This was performed for 
both spouses in households with couples.
Present value estimates
The present discounted value of SSB 
and DB pension incomes at age 65 
were determined using Social Security’s 
nominal and real interest rate estimates 
and assumptions. Real rates were used 
to discount inflation-indexed streams 
of payments (e.g., Social Security and 
some DB pensions), and nominal rates 
were used to discount unindexed streams 
(most DB pensions). The trustees’ long-
term projections are 2.9 percent for real 
interest rates and 5.7 percent for nominal 
rates beginning in 2020. Between 2010 
and 2020, nominal rates range from 
3.1 to 5.7 percent, and real rates range 
from 1.4 to 3.2 percent. The present 
discounted value of SSB and DB and net 
worth were added to obtain “augmented 
net worth” at age 65. For couples, it 
was assumed that annuities were joint-
and-survivor, with the surviving spouse 
receiving half the value of the couple’s 
benefit. Using annuity factors provided by 
the Social Security Administration’s Office 
of the Chief Actuary, the augmented net 
worth amounts were converted to an 
inflation-indexed annuity value at age 
65 for three types of households—single 
males, single females, and joint and 
survivor annuities for couples.
Calculating the final replacement ratio
This indexed annuity amount was then 
divided by the average household income 
over the five-year period from age 60-64 
for the head of household. The ratio of 
the two is the replacement rate at age 65, 
and replacement rates were calculated at 
the mean, median, and at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles for each type of household for 
each birth cohort.
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1 Net worth includes individuals who reported 
negative and zero assets.
2 A similar cohort analysis of total net worth was 
performed by E. Steurle et al., “Lost Generations? 
Wealth Building among Young Americans,” Urban 
Institute, 2013.
3 Typically, a debt-to-asset ratio is used by consumer 
finance specialists. Here the analysis uses an asset-
to-debt ratio to focus specifically on the retirement 
preparedness between the cohorts.
4 Consider that in 1989, Depression babies were 
in their 50s/60s and had median debt just under 
$10,000, while early boomers hit their 50s/60s in 2010 
with median debt just under $40,000 (see Figure 4).
5 Even before the Great Recession, many boomers 
had left the labor force before retirement age due to 
disability or lack of employment opportunities, so it is 
possible that some of their losses are also attributable 
to drawing down assets in retirement.
6 There is some evidence that Americans of all ages 
lost equity during the housing boom due to cash-out 
refinancing or simply taking out home equity lines or 
home equity lines of credit. These factors may have 
contributed to price declines during the bust.
7 Within cohorts, this analysis compares the ratio of 
couples at the 1st and 50th percentiles of replacement 
rates and the 99th and 50th percentiles of replacement 
rates. In other words, the least-prepared are at the 1st 
percentile within their cohort for their replacement 
rate, while the most-prepared are at the 99th percentile 
within their cohort for their replacement rate.
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